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INCREMENTAL CASH FLOWS, INFORMATION SETS




This paper attempts to make of the standard incremental cash flow model (SICFM) a functional
vehicle for coping with conflicts of interest. After outlining the model, residual rights to cash flows
are linked to residual risks. Then, the underlying information sets to cash flows are brought to light,
stressing the nurturing factors behind conflicts of interest: bounded rationality, asymmetric
information, opportunistic behavior and transaction costs. Next, decision rights and organization
forms are included into the frame of the paper. Finally, the core subject section shows how
incremental cash flows come in handy to root out conflicts of interest, firstly by disclosing the
residual information sets that divide managers, stockholders and creditors and, secondly, by
advocating the design of ex~ante restrictive covenants on the uses and sources of incremental
expected cash flows.
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INTRODUCTION
The expression “conflict of interest” refers to such a broad semantic range that the Oxford
Dictionary depicts it as “a situation in which there are two jobs, aims, roles, etc. and it is not
possible for both of them to be treated equally and fairly at the same time”. In particular, Finance
primarily deals with conflicts of interest that arise from environments in which at least two related
parties nurture a disagreement that will evolve out of what they are expected to deliver into what
one of them, at least, actually intends to deliver. Narrowing down the subject even more, it’s worth
trying to understand those distinctive conflicts that take place in organizations, mainly between
managers and finance providers.
For the last thirty years, Agency Theory (Ross, 1973; Jensen-Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980) has
been laying a fertile groundwork to analyze frequent types of conflicts of interest stemming from
“principal-agent” relationships. There are other types of conflicts, however, that agency theory
cannot handle successfully. For instance, when two blocks of stockholders are in conflict of
interest, no enforceable agency relationship makes clear what is falling down between them.
Different bond issues can bring about disparate bondholders constituencies with such divergent
concerns that no straightforward linkage with agency would clear up a plausible explanation. Even
among members of the Board of Directors, or in high management tiers, conflicts of interest come
up without being related to agency issues, but stemming from a clash in personal agendas. Finally,
the latest venture capital literature shows how multiple principal-agent environments make the
agency approach not the most suitable one to give account of many pervading conflicts of interest
(Gompers-Lerner,1999). It is not surprising that complementary theoretical endeavors have
evolved since the 70s to widen the scope and understanding of this subject, mainly the transaction
costs economics (Williamson, 1996), the contractual point of view (Hart, 1995, 2001; Easterbrook-
Fischel, 1991), the institutional approach (North, 1981, 1990), and the search of new foundations
for Corporate Finance (Zingales, 2000).
On the other hand, for the last decade current textbooks in Corporate Finance have given plenty of
room to the incremental cash flow model. (Benninga-Sarig,1997; Damodaran,1996, 2001; Ross et
al.,1999), because it has come in handy for working out investment projects, financial assets,
companies valuation, even corporate governance problems (Apreda, 2002).
This paper attempts to make the incremental cash flow model functional when dealing with
conflicts of interest as long as the underlying information sets of participants may be brought to
light. The proposal is set through five stages:
Section 1 will outline the standard incremental cash flow model. In section 2, residual rights to cash
flows and residual risks are introduced and distinguished from each other. It is for section 3 to
address the issue of residual rights and organization forms. Section 4 shows the conditioning of
cash flows to their underlying information sets. Section 5 expands on conflicts of interests to be
tracked from the standard incremental cash flow model and the underlying information sets that
managers, stockholders and creditors put to use whenever they deal with each other, setting forth
the convenience of restrictive covenants on the uses and sources of expected incremental cash
flows. Last of all, conclusions will follow.Universidad del Cema          Working Papers Series          Incremental Cash Flows, Information Sets and  Conflicts of Interest            Rodolfo Apreda
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1.-  THE STANDARD INCREMENTAL CASH FLOW MODEL
The so-called Standard Incremental Cash Flow Model (as from now SICFM for short) states that,
for any period [t ; t + 1] , it holds true that incremental cash flows furnished by assets at the end of
such period, are to be distributed between stockholders and creditors:
(1)
DCF t (assets)  =  DCF t (creditors)  +  DCF t (stockholders)
In other words, (1) brings forward that debt holders and stockholders have cash flows rights on the
residual income of any company.
Remarks:
•  The term “D CF t (assets)” stands for “change in cash flows from assets throughout the period [ t ; t + 1 ] ”. By
period we understand any length of time (either months, semesters or years) that becomes suitable for the
analysis.
•  Incremental cash flows may be either positive or negative.
•  Cash flows valuation in (1) is ex~post, whereas ex~ante valuation will be handled later in (7).
Although (1) bears a resemblance to the accountancy identity between assets and liabilities, stress
should be laid on two things: firstly, that it refers to flow and not stock variables as used in the
balance sheet statement and, secondly, that changes in assets have a distinctive meaning rooted
in financial assumptions that will be developed below. (Appendix 1 shows how to make explicit the
linkage between the SICMF and the financial statements currently used in Accountancy).
To begin with, cash flows to debt holders are usually split down into the following components:
(2)
DCF t (creditors)   =   interest t   +  debt repayment t   +
+  debt repurchase t  –  new debt issues t
and cash flows to be passed onto stockholders exhibit this structure:
(3)
DCF t (stockholders)   =   dividends t  +  stock repurchase t  –  new stock issues t
It can be seen from (2) and (3) that cash flows directed either to creditors or owners are positive
(outflows) and whenever the company finance itself with new issues cash flows become negative
(inflows, from creditors or stockholders toward the company). Debt and stock buybacks, on the
other hand, are positive since former claims are retired and cash flows delivered to claimants.
Remarks:
•  If there were preferred shares, then (01) would be read
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•  A nearly alike procedure holds for any outstanding lease, medium- and long-term bank loans, mortgages,
convertible bonds, or preferred convertible stock. On these grounds, it seems more comprehensive to use
“creditors” instead of “bondholders”, although this latter term is sometimes favored in current textbooks.
Background on stock and debt valuation is available either in Elton-Gruber (1995), or Damodaran (1996).
Cash flows from assets are the other side of the coin and breaking down its main components
results in
(4)
DCF t (assets)  =  D CF t (operations)  –  D CF t (working capital)  –  D CF t (fixed assets)
while cash flows from operations are defined
(5)
D CF t (operations)  =   Ebit t   –  taxes t    +  depreciation t
where  Ebitt  stands here for “earnings before interest and taxes”, DCFt (working capital)  for
additions to working capital, and  DCF t  (fixed assets) for incremental capital spending.
(Appendices 2 and 3 enlarge upon some issues relevant to the inner structure of cash flows from
assets). It must be borne in mind that the SICFM assume that short-term finance is embedded into
D CF t (working capital) since it performs like an incremental current liability, while interest payoffs
of short-term debt get their place in Ebit t ,as a matter of course.
Although cash flows from operations (5) measure up free resources after meeting taxes and adding
depreciation charges (which are not actual outflows), it would be nonsensical to distribute (5)
without taking care not only of working capital but capital investment requirements as well. For
instance, we must provision for inventories, receivables and payable accounts so as to cater for
working capital needs in (4). Also, fixed assets maintenance, the selling of outdated or obsolete
machinery, the buying of strategic fixed assets, are all investments that keep the company running
or add up to its competitive edge. Therefore, (4) conveys the residual pay offs to be distributed,
which leads to a meaningful query: how do final claimants endure the underlying risk that is at the
core of cash flows from assets?
2.-  RESIDUAL RIGHTS TO CASH FLOWS AND RESIDUAL RISKS
That cash flows rendered by assets exhibit a residual nature is thoroughly displayed in (4) and (5).
On the other hand, contractual liabilities grant that creditors must be paid before the company
addresses the owners’ claims. Besides, when in financial distress the company may be forced to
selling off its assets to pay creditors, and only if something remained it could be directed to owners.
Hence, stockholders get access only to residual rights on cash flows from assets. This can be
seen in (1) by isolating the owners’ rights to cash flows:
(6)
DCF t (stockholders)    =   DCF t (assets)  -  DCF t (creditors)
As a rule, it is up to stockholders to trade off ownership and voting rights against cash flows that
are contingent by nature onto the company’s performance. Nonetheless, they are entitled to
residual rights of net cash flows for the life of the organization.Universidad del Cema          Working Papers Series          Incremental Cash Flows, Information Sets and  Conflicts of Interest            Rodolfo Apreda
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With regard to residual rights to cash flows, so far so good. But cash flows from assets in (4) are
risky, because uncertainty in the world of business comes as a fact of life. This leads to a
substantive matter: how do both creditors and owners partake in the risks of residual cash flows?
The answer will proceed in stages. Firstly, the risky nature of the incremental cash flow model is
put forth. Secondly, residual risks are matched with stockholders’ residual rights to cash flows.
a) Changes in cash flows are predicated along the whole period [t ; t + 1]. Therefore, the standard
model gives way to both ex~post and ex~ante types of assessment. Most of the time, decision-
makers in Finance resort to an ex~ante format, which turns the cash flows into random variables. If
the valuation moment is date “ t “, then expected cash flows values are:
(7)
E[ DCF t (assets )]    =    E[ DCF t (creditors) ]  +  E[ DCF t (stockholders) ]
Since cash flows are risky, there will be discrepancies between expected values at the beginning of
the period and the ones achieved in the end, namely
(8)
DCF t (assets ]  -  E[ DCF t (assets )]    =
=  DCFt (creditors)  -  E[ DCFt (creditors) ]  +  DCFt (stockholders)  -  E[ DCFt (stockholders) ]
Remark:
•  Risk can be appraised by means of the variance or standard deviation of the underlying stochastic variables
in (1). If we did so, we would employ (8) to get
s  2 [ D CF t (assets) ]   =  s  2 [CF t (creditors) ]   +
+  s  2 [ D CF t (stockholders)]  +  2 cov [ D CF t (creditors); D CF t (stockholders) ]
That is to say, cash flows from assets are risky firstly because so are the cash flows to debt holders and
stakeholders and secondly, since there is a joint risk that they share eventually. And the same could be
stated if we worked out the risk of cash flows from assets taking into account (4) and (5). More details and
background on this matter can be found in Appendix 4.
b) Risk in cash flows to stockholders shows a distinctive financial feature that becomes apparent
when matching (6) and (7):
(9)
DCF t (stockholders)  -   E[ DCF t (stockholders) ]      =
=  DCF t (assets)  -   E[ DCF t (assets )]   +   DCF t (creditors)  -  E[ DCF t (creditors)]
Uncertainty seems inherent in cash flows brought about by assets, because we never now in
advance, at date “ t “, how well or badly the company will make through the planned investment
horizon. On the other hand, payments to debt holders are less risky in general because they are
contractual and more easily assessed. Having said that, failure in payment would take the
company to reorganization, seizure by creditors, even to court or bankruptcy. This would be theUniversidad del Cema          Working Papers Series          Incremental Cash Flows, Information Sets and  Conflicts of Interest            Rodolfo Apreda
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reason why creditors are to be paid to bear the risk of default, and their exposure matches up only
with the amount of the loan (Posner, 1998). Hence and by (9):
Stockholders are the ones to bear with the risk of the residual cash flows from assets, becoming so
the residual risk bearers.
To a greater extent, this feature proves to be a consequential matter in valuation, capital structure
and corporate governance.
3.- CONDITIONING CASH FLOWS TO THEIR UNDERLYING INFORMATION SETS
If the valuation date is “ t “, then the SICFM in (1) becomes translated by (7)
E[ DCF t (assets) ]   =   E[ DCF t (creditors) ]  +  E[ DCF t (stockholders) ]
There are manifold applications of this format to Financial Analysis. In fact, this paper attempts to
provide with a new one to get a handle on conflicts of interest.
Most of the time, changes in cash flows from assets are within the scope of managers’ control. As
soon as we let managers enter the cash flow model to join creditors and stockholders, a stage for
conflicts of interest is set up, because the main actors are confronted with different purposes,
expectations and ideas about the best way of dealing with cash flows, mainly their assessment,
final distribution and risk bearing. It is precisely because their differences do matter that the notion
of information set seems relevant.
By Information Set for any economic actor “ e “ at date “ t “ is meant all the available information
he can assess up to that date.
We denote such set
W W( t ; e )
and the fact that past information up to that date is stored in the current information set can be
translated by the condition:
W W( t – j  ; e )    ˝ ˝    W W( t ; e )    ;      j : 1, 2, 3, ......
It goes without saying that “economic actor”(or agent) stands for both individuals and
organizations.
Remarks:
•  If markets were efficient in Fama’s sense, information sets would be identical for all economic agents. But
this is not granted in the real world and, therefore, inefficient markets have become a worthy field of study
(Shleifer, 2000).Universidad del Cema          Working Papers Series          Incremental Cash Flows, Information Sets and  Conflicts of Interest            Rodolfo Apreda
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•  Contrasting an ideal economy where there is perfect information with another one endowed with imperfect
information only, Goldman and Sosin (1979) established a simple and interesting measure of market
inefficiency.
When an economic actor turns to the cash flow model (7), he is only able to appraise a heap of
expectations that are grounded on his information set at date “ t “. That is to say, (7) is conditional
to the economic actor underlying information set. Formally,
(10)
E[ DCF t (assets) ;  W( t ; e ) ]  =
=   E[ DCF t (creditors) ; W( t ; e ) ]   +   E[ DCF t (stockholders) ; W( t ; e ) ]
Remark:
•  Sometimes, the conditionality of the variable X  upon its underlying information set is denoted with a forward
slash
E[  X ￿   W( t ; e ) ]
but it seems more helpful the vectorial notation, following a widespread usage in modern mathematics.
(Apreda, 2000c)
In a world without conflicts of interest, stockholders, creditors and managers would agree on (10)
outright. Furthermore, they would likewise assess how cash flows are produced and distributed.
Moreover, all of them would pursue their self-interest, which will help each other to attain their own,
in a sort of anonymously cooperative enterprise. Finally, any of them would regard contracts fully
enforceable, costlessly designed and easily monitored. Unfortunately, this environment has
invariably being contested in real world settings.
Having said that, what the economic agent actually reaches at date “ t “ is usually an imperfect
information set:
W W( t ; e )
that conveys four striking features in everyday life:
i)  both individuals and organizations get only restrained admittance to the available
information;
ii)  two or more parties gain access to dissimilar information sets;
iii)  any economic agent may be enticed into trespassing relationships, contracts or legal
constraints;
iv)  meaningful usage of information sets cannot be achieved unless the related parties
endure and go through a great variety of costs embedded in their transactions.
To reach a discerning understanding of these four consequences, we have to delve into sensible
explanations. They will be, namely, bounded rationality, asymmetric information, opportunistic
behavior and transaction costs. (From here to the end of this section, we are going to take
advantage of an earlier paper where we focused on what we called “ the brokerage of asymmetric
information “ (Apreda,2001a) ).Universidad del Cema          Working Papers Series          Incremental Cash Flows, Information Sets and  Conflicts of Interest            Rodolfo Apreda
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3.1.    Bounded Rationality
As for gaining access to information sets, either time or effort spending seems unavoidable.
Bounded rationality refers to the manifold costs that arise whenever the economic actor looks for,
finds out, gather, processes, organizes, evaluates, stores, makes meaning use of, or trades with
information.
It was Herbert Simon (1947) the first to install this subject as academically relevant, giving rise to
the Bounded Rationality Approach. Since models of bounded rationality are grounded on the idea
of scarcity, they deal with human cognition like a scarce resource. Furthermore, deliberation about
an economic decision is also a costly activity in which the decision maker tries to achieve a
balance between the benefits of better decisions and the cost of additional allocation of effort to the
decision-making process. (This topic is extensively developed in Conslisk, 1996).
The main concern with bounded rationality for the analysis of conflicts of interest lies on the fact
that contracts are in practice not only incomplete but costly to monitoring and enforcement. In other
words, drafted contracts are not able to foresee all the contingencies, courses of actions and
consequences.
3.2.  Asymmetric Information
While exchanging goods and services among them, economic actors and their intermediaries
jointly engage in a twofold process (Apreda, 2001a):
•  the actual trade  of goods, services, securities, or derivatives contracts on goods and
securities;
•  a virtual exchange of smaller subsets of their information sets so as to bind both parties
within the boundaries of their common knowledge.
This process leads to the issue of asymmetric information. In fact, let us suppose that agent “k”
(the principal, a company owner for instance) is about to offer a contract to “s” (the agent, a
manager for instance). In other words, they exchange compensation granted by “k”  for effort,
proficiency and a fiduciary role promised by “s”. In order to do so, they share information, but only
to a certain extent, as it is depicted in picture 1. That is to say:
W W(t ; k)   „ „   W W(t ; s)
Although this feature should not prevent counterparts from rounding off their transaction, a new
development arises. One of the parties may take advantage of not-shared information on behalf of
his own interest to the extent of getting much more from his counterpart than it would have been
the case if that private information had been shared.
Asymmetric Information  refers to the advantage one party can enjoy by having different
information than his counterpart, so as to improve either from the trade or the relationship for his
own benefit.Universidad del Cema          Working Papers Series          Incremental Cash Flows, Information Sets and  Conflicts of Interest            Rodolfo Apreda
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Picture 1 conveys the main idea. Both agents share some information for sure, as we can see in
the subset of common knowledge   W(t ; k) ˙ W(t ; s), but they also have information that remains
hidden or non-accessible to each counterpart. In this case, we can point at two subsets that are
private information regions: agent “k” keeps nonshared information for himself, and the same can
be predicated on the agent “s” likely behavior.
Why would the economic agent take profit of nonshared private information, rendering in that way
conflict of interests? The answer lies on opportunistic behavior.
3.3.  Opportunistic Behavior
It is a tenet of Economic Analysis that agents behave so as to fulfill their self-interest (Adam Smith,
1777).
When we think that agents perform their goals in a world of future commitments and uncertainty,
the concurrence of self-interest and the likelihood of breaking promises to deliver goods, services,
efforts or payments in the future, both lead to Opportunistic Behavior.
If one party knew something that the other did not, that party may willingly distort, misrepresent or
not disclose such information on his own benefit, what amounts to self-interest with guile.
Opportunistic behavior can follow even without asymmetric information (pilfering and shirking at the
workplace being current examples), albeit asymmetric information often seems a driver for
opportunism.
Asymmetric information does, in fact, provide with advantage to its holder, and explains a lot of
things about market intermediaries (see, for instance, Demsetz, 1968 or Spulber 1996).
Arbitrageurs and speculators, for instance, take profit in markets from their superior information
sets, without necessarily impairing counterparts’ property rights or fostering conflicts of interest.
This example proves that asymmetric information is not a sufficient condition for opportunism.
Smart economic actors playing in the markets grab opportunities and reap the gains of the trade
without becoming opportunistic eventually.
Picture 1
Two parties trade on the intersection of their information sets
W(t ; k)
W(t ; s)
W(t ; k)  ˙  W(t ; s)Universidad del Cema          Working Papers Series          Incremental Cash Flows, Information Sets and  Conflicts of Interest            Rodolfo Apreda
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To make precise the boundaries between “smart” behavior of well informed economic actors and
“opportunistic” behavior, Williamson and others add to the latter a further qualification by means of
the phrase “with guile”, that is, the use of clever but dishonest behavior in order to deceive other
people.
Picture 2 deploys the fact that, if opportunistic behavior were to take place, it would come out of the
“private domains“ within those information sets that each actor keeps under wraps:
  i.  for the econonic agent “k”, it is  the subset  W(t ; k)  ˙  W C (t ; s), which reads as “ the
points in the information set  W(t ; k) not shared by the set  W(t ; s) ” (background on this
set operation is given in Appendix 5)
  ii.  for the econonic agent “s”, it is  the subset  W C (t ; k)  ˙  W(t ; s), which reads as “ the
points in the information set  W(t ; s) not shared by the set  W(t ; k) ”.
Summing up, the region where most of conflicts of interest arise consists of both information sets
excluding their intersection. This amounts to what in Mathematics is called the “symmetric
difference set” (See Appendix 5 for a reminder). That is to mean:
W W(t ; k)  D D  W W(t ; s)   =   [  W W(t ; k)  ˙ ˙  W W C (t ; s) ]  ¨ ¨  [ W W C (t ; k)  ˙ ˙  W W(t ; s) ]
Picture 2 
Parties can take advantage of asymmetric information while trading
Remarks:
•  It can be argued that one party may even perform opportunistically in the intersection of both information
sets. Although this event is a likely one, for instance when one party behaves in a stupid way, bounded
rationality would rule out this outcome most of the time.
•  Mathematical foundations for the structure of information sets, based on rings and algebras of sets, can be
found in Apreda (2000c).
W(t ; k) ˙  W C (t ; s)
   (private information )
W C (t ; k) ˙  W (t ; s)
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Generally speaking, we must bear in mind that some of these single and private subsets, may
convey information not relevant for the trade. It is what remains of those subsets, however, that
nurtures different kinds of knowledge pertaining any trade, as represented in picture 3:
i. Not every piece of information included in the information set of the agent “k” is actually
needed for a particular transaction. Hence, we can isolate at date “ t “ pieces of information
not relevant for the trade:
W(t ; k; irrelevant to the trade)
ii. Next, useful information for the party but not harmful towards the counterparts interest
(namely, know-how, expertise, professional qualifications, customers and advisers
networks, reputation) is found in the subset
W(t ; k; useful to the trade but private)
iii. Finally, useful information for the party, but the sort of which conveys impairment or
damage to the counterpart’s interest is included in
W(t ; k; relevant to the trade; opportunistic; unfavorable to agent “s” )
Picture 3 : Irrelevant, useful  and opportunistic subsets in an information set
W(t;k)                              W(t ; k; private information irrelevant to the trade)
                                      W(t ; k; private information useful to the trade but private)
W(t ; k; private information relevant to the trade; opportunistic;
unfavorable to agent “s”)
W(t ; k)  ˙  W  (t ; s)
(common knowledge that
nurtures contracts and relationships)
W C (t ; k) ˙  W (t ; s)
                           W(t;s)Universidad del Cema          Working Papers Series          Incremental Cash Flows, Information Sets and  Conflicts of Interest            Rodolfo Apreda
11
3.4.- Transaction Costs
The Transaction Costs Approach matches bounded rationality with self-interest-seeking, even to
the extent that rules or contracts might be trespassed, often with guile. It also recognizes that any
time economic agents behave opportunistically they may disclose information only to their own
advantage, by selecting and distorting it within broad contexts of personal agenda and agency
misdeeds.
Williamson (1996) defines transaction costs this way:
“The ex~ante costs of drafting, negotiating and safeguarding an agreement and, more especially, the ex~post cost of
maladaptation and adjustment that arise when contract execution is misaligned as a result of gaps, errors, omission,
and unanticipated disturbances. Also it refers to the costs of running the economic system.”
Nevertheless, to regard the economic agent behavior as the main source of transaction costs may
be misleading, because institutions and technology have a conclusive say in the ultimate size of
transaction costs (North, 1990). Hence, a broader outline should include intermediaries (Spulber,
1999) and also encompass important cost components like trading, information, taxes, financial
and microstructure costs (Apreda, 2000a, 2000b)
4.-  DECISION RIGHTS, AGENCY PROBLEMS AND ORGANIZATION FORMS
Focusing on contracts has allowed economists to understand much better how decision-making,
organization forms and residual rights may be joined together. It seems relevant for the purposes
of this paper to outline firstly the separation of decision rights and, secondly, the linkage between
organization forms and the allocation of residual rights. In between, agency problems are briefly
reviewed because they amount to a pervasive by-product of organization design and decision
rights allocation.
4.1.  Separation of management and control decision rights
The advantage of breaking decision rights into managerial and controlling rights to explain the
survival of organizations, was a key point widely researched by Hart (1995,2001), Williamson
(1996), Fama and Jensen (1983b). As a matter of fact, it was predicated that decision-making
processes in organizations go through four stages:
•  Initiation: proposals are set forth about the best ways of using available resources and designing contracts.
•  Ratification: proposals are chosen for implementation
•  Implementation: those proposals that were ratified are brought forth into execution
•  Monitoring: it comprises following up, auditing, appraising, rewarding or punishing decision-makers upon
their performance
While initiation and implementation fall under the scope of managers (endowing them with
management rights), ratification and monitoring are kept within the boundaries of decision
controlling committees (hence granted with control rights, and fiduciary duties as with the Board of
Directors). As soon as the complexity of an organization makes advisable to deal this way with the
allocation of decision rights, it is said that management and control are separated.Universidad del Cema          Working Papers Series          Incremental Cash Flows, Information Sets and  Conflicts of Interest            Rodolfo Apreda
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In the life of corporations, control in the hands of shareholders through the Board of Directors
seems the key to the protection of their residual rights. However, as Zingales (2000) points out,
organizations in general, and corporations in particular, may be currently evolving toward a new
format of control by which the protection of residual rights turns out to become not only a concern
to shareholders, but to other stakeholders in the organization as well (employees, creditors,
government, communities, suppliers and even customers)
4.2.  Agency Problems
Agency relationships stand out among the major determinants that shape the structure of any
organization and their distribution of decision rights. They consists of the following features:
  i.  there are two parties: a principal (one or more) and an agent (one or more);
  ii.  the agent commits effort and proficiency so as to work on behalf of the principal’s interest;
  iii.  the principal promises a compensation and incentives for the agent to fulfill his commitment;
  iv.  the relationship is grounded on a contract, either formal or informal.
A wide variety of sources can bring about problems to this relationship, usually labeled “agency
problems”. Particular stress must be laid on the following sources:
•  Incomplete and costly contracts that arise from bounded rationality and transaction costs.
•  Drafting, enforcement and monitoring tasks that are hindered by asymmetric information and opportunistic
behavior.
Within for-profit organizations, agency problems are rooted in conflicts of interests among owners,
managers and creditors that evolve from the normal running of the company to the extent of
financial distress (background on this subject in Jensen-Smith, 1985).
In the basic setting, we find the shareholders expecting that their agent managers (officers and
directors) service the firm’s debt and set up a growing residual value for its owners. Creditors, on
their own, have lower risks linked to their property rights than owners. Managers have contractual
duties to creditors but fiduciary duties toward their principals (where the term fiduciary stands for
acting on behalf of the interest of the principal as if agents were promoting their own interests). But
if a company became financially distressed and insolvency threatened, managers’ fiduciary duties
would shift away from value enhancement owed to shareholders, toward preserving value for
creditors. In this environment, corporate assets are regarded as a trust fund for the benefit of the
creditors.
4.3.  Organization forms and residual rights
The restrictions that contracts, bylaws, and internal rules of the game, impose to holders of
residual rights actually hinge on which organization forms are available to them. Furthermore,
residual rights also depend on the law and legal conventions of each nation within which
companies run their operations.
The main examples of the relationship between organization forms and residual rights are outlined
in the table below.Universidad del Cema          Working Papers Series          Incremental Cash Flows, Information Sets and  Conflicts of Interest            Rodolfo Apreda
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The entrepreneur is at the same time his manager and the owner, bearing all the residual risks and




Shareholders are liable only to the extent of the face value of the shares they own. Size and capital
structure will shape the breadth of shareholders residual rights. It is a well-established organization
form among firms of small and medium size around many countries and from the 90’s in the United




They issue common stock, with limited liability. Stockholders become residual risk bearers, with a
claim on residual rights to cash flows, and voting rights. Those claims are the least restricted: they
become easily traded, have unlimited life, and stockholders do not have to perform any duty within
the organization. It is said that corporations are legal fictions, distinctive and separate from their
owners, having rights, duties and privileges of an actual person. There is a clear separation of
management and control decision rights. (Easterbrook-Fischel, 1991)
Closed
Corporations
The main difference with an open corporation is that here residual claims are largely restricted to
internal decision agents. So, there is much less separation between management and risk bearing
with control than in open corporations. In general, they have relatively few managers and they are
usually the largest residual claimants. (Easterbrook-Fischel, 1991)
Limited
Partnerships
Some partners’ liability is limited to their contribution to capital, and they usually are not engaged
with the running of the business. However, liability of other partners is unlimited, and they become
working partners. Limited partnerships are registered and have limited life. Examples are found
either in venture capital investment firms, research and development partnerships, and real estates
companies. (Demirag, 1998; Gompers-Lerner, 1999; Klausner-Litvak, 2001)
Professional
Partnerships
Residual claims are restricted to partners whose tasks bring about services to their customers, as it
happens with those engaged in the law, accounting, business consulting, and medicine fields.
Professional partnerships are seldom registered. (Fama-Jensen, 1983a, 1983b)
Financial
Mutuals
Here customers are the residual claimants. For instance, they can be shareholders of mutual funds,
or policyholders in mutual insurance companies. Also, they usually do not take part in the internal
affairs of those companies. (Fama-Jensen, 1983a, 1983b)
Not-for-profit
Organizations
In general, there are no residual claims on net cash flows from the side of donors. It is the case of
churches, universities, museums, classical music institutions, hospitals and other charities. Most of
them have tax privileges, and all of them face a non-distribution contract (they are not allowed to




Here we have some units owned by the company and others that are franchised. Franchisees
purchase a residual claim for their units, while franchisors earn a proportion of sales revenues as a
franchise fee, keeping for themselves some decision rights (building design, menu selection, lease
of assets, advertising, training, legal and accounting advice, public relations). The central company
monitors for product quality, budget control, contract renewal and termination. (Brickley-Dark, 1987)Universidad del Cema          Working Papers Series          Incremental Cash Flows, Information Sets and  Conflicts of Interest            Rodolfo Apreda
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Posner (1998) highlights a distinctive feature by which corporations may supersede other
organization forms:
“ Firms in which the inputs are primarily labor rather than capital often are partnerships or individual proprietorships
rather than corporations. The corporation is primarily a method of solving problems encountered in raising substantial
amounts of capital.”
From now on, we are going to be concerned with corporations, either open or closed, albeit much
of what follows should be predicated on other organization forms as well.
5.- CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND INCREMENTAL CASH FLOWS
It is time to bring together the main building blocks that have already been set forth in the paper.
For certain, there is a wide range of conflicts of interest that can be handled by means of the
incremental cash flows model. But in order to draw from this model as much as possible, three
changes in its simplest format (1) must be undertaken beforehand.
a) Introduction of Managers Pay Package
Firstly, we recall from (4) that
D CF t (operations)  =   Ebit t   –  taxes t    +  depreciation t
and secondly,  that Ebit t  can be broken down into two components:
(11)
Ebit t  =   Ebit t  (excluding managers pay package )  –  D CF t (managers pay package)
or, briefly:
Ebit t  =   Ebit t  (net )  –  D CF t (managers pay package)
That is to say, Ebit  t (net) means earnings before interest and taxes excluding outflows to
managers. The expression “managers pay package” refers to what in fact amounts to a portfolio
whose most distinctive components are: cash, bonuses, fringe benefits, stock options, stock
appreciation rights, phantom stock, restricted stock, preferred convertible stock, and convertible
bonds. (Background on managers pay packages is given in Murphy (1998) ).
Therefore, (5) can be blended with (11) to deliver
(12)
DCF t (operations)    =     Ebit t  (net)  –  taxes t    +  depreciation t   –
–  DCF t (managers pay package)   =
=  DCF t (operations; excluding managers pay package)   –   DCF t (managers pay package )Universidad del Cema          Working Papers Series          Incremental Cash Flows, Information Sets and  Conflicts of Interest            Rodolfo Apreda
15
while (4) will be changed by (12) into
DCF t (assets)    =    DCF t (operations; excluding managers pay package ) –
 –  DCF t (managers pay package)   –   DCF t (working capital)  –  DCF t (fixed assets)
All this lead up to
(13)
DCF t (assets)   =
=   DCF t (assets; excluding managers pay package )    –   DCF t (managers pay package)
Plugging (13) into (1), we can translate the standard incremental cash flow model under this guise:
(14)
DCF t (assets; excluding managers pay package )   =    DCF t (assets;  net )   =
=    DCF t (creditors)   +  DCF t (stockholders)   +   DCF t ( pay-offs portfolio to managers )
Henceforth, and for ease of notation, we are going to rewrite (14) this way:
DCF t ( a;  net )      =     DCF t ( c )    +   DCF t ( s )    +    DCF t ( m  )
b) Introduction of Cash Assets
The following equation exhibits the main current assets components:
DCF t (current assets)    =   D t (cash)  +  D t (short-term investments)  +
+  D t (inventories)  +  D t (accounts receivable)  +  D t (other items)
We break down the expected cash balance change into two components:
•  cash required for normal operations, D t (cash for operations), which should be included in
working capital provisions for the daily running of a business;
•  cash non-required for normal operations in the period, D  t ( cash not-for-operations), which
actually perform as a stock of excess liquidity.
Furthermore, D t (short-term investments) do not need to become out-flows in the period. On the
contrary, this is the place where many companies should set up and manage financial assets
portfolios. Main short-term investments include stocks and bonds not issued by the firm,
government bonds, term-deposits at banks, derivatives assets, investment in mutual funds and
promissory notes. (A full discussion can be found in Appendix 2)Universidad del Cema          Working Papers Series          Incremental Cash Flows, Information Sets and  Conflicts of Interest            Rodolfo Apreda
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As from now, we will call “cash assets” to both D t (cash not-for-operations) and D t (short-term
investments)
(15)
D t (cash assets)  =  D t (cash not-for-operations)  +  D t (short-term investments)
Recalling the incremental the equation (4) in the incremental cash flow model (1), we can reshape
the cash flows from assets so as to give room to (15):
DCF t (assets)   =   DCF t (operations)   –   DCF t (cash assets)   –
–   DCF t (working capital excluding cash assets)  –  DCF t (fixed assets)
All this leads up to
(16)
DCF t (assets)   =
=  DCF t (assets; excluding cash assets )    –   DCF t (cash assets)
By using (16) jointly with (1), we get
(17)
DCF t (assets; excluding cash assets )     =    DCF t (assets; net )   =
=    DCF t (creditors)   +   DCF t (stockholders)   +    DCF t (cash assets)
c) The Standard Incremental Cash Flow Model
with managers pay package and cash assets
The procedure followed to obtain firstly (14) and secondly (17) could have been undertaken at the
same time. In that case, the final outcome would have been:
(18)
DCF t (assets; excluding cash assets and managers pay package )     =    DCF t (assets; net )   =
= DCF t (creditors) +  DCF t (stockholders) + DCF t (cash assets) + DCF t (managers pay package)
To ease notation, we can rewrite (18) this way:
DCF t ( a;  net )      =     DCF t ( c )    +   DCF t ( s )    +    DCF t ( m  )   +    DCF t (cash)
This is the most suitable extension of the cash model to analyze conflicts of interest. The message
that (18) conveys is clear:
Conflicts of interest among stockholders, debt holders, and managers lay open to view by the way
net cash flows from assets are to be distributed in the first place, and how one or more claimants
can eventually expropriate cash flows from the others, in the second place.Universidad del Cema          Working Papers Series          Incremental Cash Flows, Information Sets and  Conflicts of Interest            Rodolfo Apreda
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We are going to focus on conflicts arising from two current environments: in the first place, the
relationship between creditors and managers and, in the second place, the relationship between
managers and owners. Finally, conflicts of interest and the standard incremental cash flow model
will be linked with the purpose of showing how the latter can contribute to lessen the impact of the
former, to the benefit of finance providers and desirable levels of transparency in capital markets.
5.1. Conflicts of interest between bondholders and managers
Two illustrations are to be developed below. One pertains to a situation where no financial distress
seems likely, the other to a situation where creditors are smart and their information sets prove to
be more endowed than what was expected by managers.
a)   Case 1: Here, we are going to deal with a simple context, in which there is absence of
financial distress. In the normal running of the business, debt holders follow up their
expected cash flows with this likely format:
(19)
E[ DCF t ( c ); W( t ; c ) ]   =   E[ interest t ; W( t ; c )]  +   E[ debt repayment t ; W( t ; c ) ]  
whereas the managers expectations amounts to another kind of assessment:
(20)
E[ DCF t ( c ); W( t ; m ) ]   =
=     E[ interest t ; W( t ; m ) ]  +   E[ debt repayment t ;  W( t ; m ) ]  +
+   E[ debt repurchase t ; W( t ; m ) ] –  E[ new debt issues t ; W( t ; m ) ]
As we see by contrasting (19) with (20), managers take advantage of private information to the
extent that outside debt holders cannot foresee internal decisions, mainly regarding debt
repurchase and new debt issues. Assuming that services on debt interest and repayment were
common knowledge, then any impending conflict of interest would be measured out of the
difference
(21)
E[ debt repurchase t ; W( t ; m ) ˙  W C ( t ; c ) ] –   E[ new debt issues t ; W( t ; m ) ˙  W  C ( t ; c ) ]
because any decision-making concerning these cash flows could improve or worsen the creditors’
portfolios not only in market values but in their risk profiles as well.
The subset depicted in (21)
W( t ; m ) ˙   W C ( t ; c )Universidad del Cema          Working Papers Series          Incremental Cash Flows, Information Sets and  Conflicts of Interest            Rodolfo Apreda
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must be regarded as a residual information set and discloses the source of asymmetric information
that allow managers the pursuing of their goals in the normal running of the company. Up to this
point, their behavior could be neutral as regards the creditors’ interest. (Residual information sets
and differential rates of return are thoroughly addressed in Apreda, 2002).
However, if managers acted opportunistically, their goals would be at variance with the ones held
by creditors, even by stockholders. For instance, a new issue of bonds can damage the market
value of the older ones still alive, since the new bonds may convey competitive covenants, higher
contractual interest rates or better maturity conditions. Still worse, debt holders may find it is hard
to gain access to information about refinancing, repurchase, mergers and acquisitions, or outright
default, while such detrimental happenings might be waiting in the pipeline. There being a chance
of contesting creditors’ expectations, the size of the gap out of (19) and (20) widens at their
expense, eventually.
b)  Case 2: Another context worthy of being outlined is the one where the creditors become
more demanding, as it is the case with banks, insurance companies, institutional investors,
or market analysts. Better-informed investors can follow up their expected cash flows by
resorting to the incremental cash flow model (7) and setting forth their assessments by
means of
(22)
E[ DCF t ( c ) ; W( t ; c ) ]   =
=  E[ DCF t ( a ) ; W( t ; c ) ]  -    E[ DCF t ( s ); W( t ; c ) ]
to be jointly used with (19) to expand on the cash flows expected from their investments.
On their side, managers can take a stand against this much better informed investor by using (14)
and resorting to residual information sets
(23)
E[ DCF t ( a ;  net ) ; W( t ; m ) ]    =    E[ DCF t ( c ) ; W( t ; m ) ˙  W C ( t ; c ) ]    +
+   E[ DCFt (s); W(t; m) ˙  W C (t; c) ]   +   E[ DCF t ( managers pay package) ; W(t; m) ˙ W C (t; c) ]
jointly with (13) and (20) to expand on their own forecasts about debt holders cash flows.
As we see from this perspective, asymmetric information is greater here to the advantage of
managers, since the outsider finds out that in (22) is much harder to look into cash flows
components and information about the pay package is often unattainable. Finally, any stronger
information impairment can be tracked on capital investment and working capital provisions in (4)
DCF t (assets)  =  D CF t (operations)  –  D CF t (working capital)  –  D CF t (fixed assets)
that could be kept under wraps by the management, a thorny issue which mingles with free-cash
flows in the sense of Jensen (1986). (Appendix 6 deals with this matter).Universidad del Cema          Working Papers Series          Incremental Cash Flows, Information Sets and  Conflicts of Interest            Rodolfo Apreda
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Remarks:
•  This type of conflict is usually predicated on debt holders against managers, albeit most of the time it seems
a conflict between the whole firm and debt holders, provided that managers perform on behalf of the
company’s owners.
•  But the conflict might directly develop between creditors and stockholders whenever managers set up their
hidden agendas and favor creditors to the detriment of the owners. Also they can impair debt holders and
owners’ interests at the same time, as it seems to be the case in some leverage-buy-outs attempts, and also
in many instances of corporate control contests. (More background on this in Holmstrom-Kaplan (2001)).
5.2. Conflicts of interest between stockholders and managers
Two illustrative examples will be followed up here. The first one assumes stockholder blocks and a
fairly efficient Board of Directors ready to work on behalf of owners, making every effort to prevent
managers from deflecting the company’s net income towards their pockets.
The second one is a more down-to-earth environment that shows a mixed ownership, where some
groups of stockholders are older (internal claimants) while others are younger like institutional
investors, financial institutions or minority groups (external claimants). In this case we also suppose
that the Board may have entrenched interests with the incumbent management (often through
executive directors) and managers hold sway over most of the decision-making within the firm. Let
us deal with each context in turn.
a)  Case 1: When in the first alternative, the stockholder assessment of expected cash flows
comes out of
(24)
E[DCF t ( s ); W( t ; s ) ]   =
E[ dividends t ; W( t ; s ) ]   –   E[ new stock issues t ; W( t ; s )]
while managers profit from
(25)
E[DCF t ( s ); W( t ; m ) ]    =     E[ dividends t ; W( t ; m ) ]   +
+    E[stock repurchase t  ; W( t ; m ) ]   –    E[ new stock issues t ; W( t ; m )]
The line of discussion here will closely follow the environment faced by creditors in (19) and (20).
But a striking difference lies on the unpredictability of dividends streams in (24), in contrast with the
contractual future cash flows delivered to creditors.
The impending conflicts of interest between managers and stockholders will evolve out of the
managers’ opportunistic behavior as long as they can calibrate their assessments from (25) by
means of the following format with residual information sets:Universidad del Cema          Working Papers Series          Incremental Cash Flows, Information Sets and  Conflicts of Interest            Rodolfo Apreda
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 E[DCF t ( s ); W( t ; m )]     =     E[ dividends t ; W( t ; m ) ˙  W  C ( t ; s ) ]   +
+    E[stock repurchase t  ; W(t; m) ˙  W C (t; c)]   –  E[ new stock issues t ; W(t; m) ˙  W C (t ; c)]
b)  Case 2 : Now we make for a more complex environment, the one by which smart
stockholders (for instance, institutional investors or large stockholder blocks) demand
better and accurate information, and their forecasts not only are grounded on (24) but in
net cash flows from assets as well:
(26)
E[ DCF t ( s ) ; W( t ; s ) ]   =
E[ DCF t ( a ) ; W( t ; s ) ]  -    E[ DCF t ( c ); W( t ; s ) ]
The countervailing assessment on the side of managers can be measured in stages, by looking
over their realized and expected cash flows deliverable to stockholders.
  i.  At date “ t + 1 “, hence ex~post it holds:
(27)
[ DCF t ( s ); W( t + 1 ; m ) ]     =   [ DCF t ( s ); W( t + 1 ; s ) ]   +
+   [ DCF t ( s ); W( t + 1 ; m ) ˙  W C (t  + 1 ; s ) ]
  ii.  At date “ t “, hence ex~ante, the expected value of these cash flows must have been
  (28)
E[ DCF t ( s ); W( t ; m ) ]   =    E [ DCF t ( s ); W( t ; s ) ]    +
+     E [ DCF t ( s ); W(  t ; m ) ˙  W C ( t ; s ) ]
  iii.  Substracting (28) from (27) we get the discrepancies between expected and realized cash
flows for managers and stockholders.
(29)
D m   =    [ DCF t ( s ); W( t + 1; m ) ]   -  E[ DCF t ( s ); W( t ; m ) ]  =
=   [ DCF t ( s ); W( t + 1 ; s ) ]  -  E [ DCF t (s); W( t ; s ) ]   +
+   [ DCF t ( s ); W(  t + 1 ; m ) ˙  W C ( t  + 1 ; s ) ]  -  E [ DCF t ( s ); W(  t ; m ) ˙  W C ( t ; s ) ]
  iv.  It is when the absolute value of the difference
(30)
D s    =   [ DCF t ( s ); W( t + 1 ; s ) ]  -   E [ DCF t ( s ); W( t ; s ) ]
increases that can be assumed managers might have profited from their asymmetric information.
  v.  By the same token, it is when the absolute value of the differenceUniversidad del Cema          Working Papers Series          Incremental Cash Flows, Information Sets and  Conflicts of Interest            Rodolfo Apreda
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(31)
D  gap    =
=    [ DCF t ( s ); W(  t + 1 ; m ) ˙  W  C ( t  + 1 ; s ) ]  -   E [ DCF t ( s ); W(  t ; m ) ˙  W C (t ; s ) ]
decreases that can be assumed managers have taken advantage of their asymmetric information,
and are able to reduce this gap between realized and expected discrepancies with respect to
stockholders valuation.
Remark:
•  The implicit risk in (30) and (31) is embedded into the variance of (29) - see Appendix 4 for a reminder -
leading to:
s  2 [ D m ]   =  s  2 [ D  s ]   +   s  2 [D  gap ]   +  2 cov [D  s; D  gap  ]
5.3. Conflicts of interest and the incremental cash flow model:
The lesson from the foregoing discussion lies in the asymmetric information that favors managers
(or the whole company) when dealing with incumbent or prospective creditors on the one side, and
owners, on the other side. The residual information set
W W(t; m) ˙ ˙  W W C (t; c)
fosters managers’ opportunistic behavior and may lead to outright wealth expropriation of finance
providers.
In order to prevent this from happening, there are two problem-solving procedures in which
creditors and owners should engage themselves, grounded on the design of suitable covenants.
Creditors Covenants
Whenever creditors are able to include suitable covenants in any debt contract, they can put
restraints in the expected incremental cash flows, mainly those that belong to the private
information held by managers as shown next, by matching distinctive incremental cash flows with
their most usual covenants (far from intending a complete list, we only provide some examples):
dividends t    stating restrictions on dividends, till new debt
maturity
DCF t (managers pay package) covenants on stock options, stock appreciation
rights, phantom stock, restricted stock
D CF t (working capital)  +  D CF t (fixed assets) limiting incremental provisions to working capital
and fixed capital, mainly the selling of old assets
or purchasing of new ones coming up when
restructuring the company  Universidad del Cema          Working Papers Series          Incremental Cash Flows, Information Sets and  Conflicts of Interest            Rodolfo Apreda
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new debt issues t + new stock issues t  vetoing new issuances of debt or stock unless
explicit creditors’s consent
debt repurchase t  +  stock repurchase t   disallowing debt and stock repurchases
depreciation t claiming for sinking funds to build up replacement
value and avoid discretionary applications to free
cash flows
That is to say, the whole structure of the incremental cash flow model (see picture 4 below)
watchfully track the numbers making the managers’ information sets more accountable, while
creditors improve their own information sets eventually. Although good groundwork has been done
in the subject matter of bond and bank loans covenants since Smith’ survey paper (Smith, 1979),
only recently they have been linked to the standard incremental cash flow model (Apreda 2002a,
2000c).
Stockholders Covenants
Finally, we turn to the stockholders (see picture 4 below). Whereas covenants to bank debt or
bonds are embedded in their issuance contracts outright, protective restrictions on behalf of
stockholders may be found at least in three institutional vehicles: the company’s charter, the
company’s bylaws and restrictions drafted in specific issuance contracts. Such sources provide
with a manifold approach that allow shareholders and the Board of Directors to curb ex~post
discretion from the managers’ and even creditors’ side, by writing down covenants on incremental
cash flows, as depicted in the following examples.
DCF t (cash assets) monitoring both cash and the investment portfolio
to avoid these resources to be deflected toward
managers empire building or personal agendas
DCF t (managers pay package) design of incentives to management through
stock options, stock appreciation rights, phantom
stock, restricted stock, bonuses
D CF t (working capital)  +  D CF t (fixed assets) setting tight budget constraints
new debt issues t + new stock issues t vetoing new issuances of debt or stock unless
explicit Boards or stockholders consent
debt repurchase t  +  stock repurchase t  disallowing debt and stock repurchasesUniversidad del Cema          Working Papers Series          Incremental Cash Flows, Information Sets and  Conflicts of Interest            Rodolfo Apreda
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Picture 4
The Structure of the Incremental Cash Flow Model
  i.  Model Setting
DCF t (assets)  =  DCF t (creditors)  +  DCF t (stockholders)
  ii.  Inner Structure Expansion
DCF t (assets; excluding cash assets and managers pay package )  =  DCF t (assets; net )  =
= DCF t (creditors) +  DCF t (stockholders) + DCF t (cash assets) + DCF t (managers pay package)
  iii.  Main Components on the Creditor’s Side
DCF t (creditors)   =   interest t   +  debt repayment t   +
+  debt repurchase t  –  new debt issues t
  iv.  Main Components on the Stockholder’s Side
DCF t (stockholders)   =   dividends t  +  stock repurchase t  –  new stock issues t
  v.  Structure of Incremental Cash Flows from Assets
DCF t (assets)  =  D CF t (operations)  –  D CF t (working capital)  –  D CF t (fixed assets)
D CF t (operations)  =   Ebit t   –  taxes t    +  depreciation tUniversidad del Cema          Working Papers Series          Incremental Cash Flows, Information Sets and  Conflicts of Interest            Rodolfo Apreda
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CONCLUSIONS
The standard incremental cash flow model (SICFM) exhibits a functionality that goes beyond
valuation issues. This paper shows that the SICFM can help to understand conflicts of interest. It
does so by firstly disclosing the information sets that underlies the cash flows and, secondly, by
assuming that economic agents (individuals and organizations) always face and are affected by
bounded rationality, asymmetric information, opportunistic behavior and transaction costs.
We have argued that the internal structure of incremental cash flows from assets, as well as those
of the incremental cash flows to creditors and stockholders, convey different information that is
contingent on who assesses the cash flows, at variance with symmetric assumptions currently held
in valuation theory and practice. It is at this point that conflicts of interest drive a wedge between
what one party is expected to deliver and what he actually delivers. Not to be surprised, the divide
usually damages the relationship among creditors, stockholders and managers, from impairing
most of the time the company value enhancement, to the extent of destroying value eventually.
Last of all, it has been shown how, by means of a careful design and embedding of covenants in
debt contracts, stock issuances, and the company’s bylaws, most of the private information in the
hands of managers or companies that could damage the agency relationships with creditors and
owners, can be tracked down from the incremental cash flow model. This would contribute to
strengthen the accountability, value enhancing and performance appraisal of the company in the
eyes of finance providers.Universidad del Cema          Working Papers Series          Incremental Cash Flows, Information Sets and  Conflicts of Interest            Rodolfo Apreda
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APPENDIX 1 Incremental Cash Flow Model and Financial Statements
From the balance sheet items and the income-loss statement, the incremental cash flow it will be derived below in
stages.
Stage 1:  Shaping the main items in a balance sheet under the guise of incremental variables, we get
(A1-01)
DCF t (working capital)  +  DCF t (fixed assets)  +  DCF t (cash assets)  +  DCF t (cash)   =
D t (net new debt)  +  D t (net new stock) +  DCF t (retained earnings)
By cash assets it is meant short-term and long-term financial assets held by the company as investment portfolios. On
the other hand, by “net new debt” and “net new stock” it is understood namely:
DCF t (net new debt)     =     debt repurchase t   –  new debt issues t
DCF t (stockholders)   =   stock repurchase t  –  new stock issues t
Stage 2 : Recalling the sources of retained earnings,
(A1-02)
DCF t (retained earnings)   =   change in non-distributed dividends t    =   DCF t (nd-dividends)
Stage 3 : Relating non-distributed dividends with cash flows from operations:
(A1-03)
D CF t (operations)  =   Ebit t   –  taxes t    +  depreciation t   =  interest t +  dividends t  +  nd-dividends t
By plugging (A1-03) firstly in (A1-02) and lastly in (A1-01), rearranging it holds that
[ D CF t (operations)  –  DCF t (working capital)  –  DCF t (fixed assets) ]   =
=  [ interest t +  D t (net new debt) ] +  [ dividends t  +  D t (net new stock) ]  +  DCF t (cash assets) +  DCF t (cash)
But the left-side of this relationship amounts to cash flows from assets, while the first pair of square brackets lead to
cash flows to be sent to creditors, and the second pair of square brackets to cash flows to be sent to stockholders.
Hence:
(A1-04)
 D CF t (assets)    =
=  [  D t (creditors)  +   D t (stockholders) ]  +  DCF t (cash assets) +  DCF t (cash)
This is the more general setting for the incremental cash flow model. In particular, by subsuming the non-cash assets
and the remaining cash into the incremental working capital, the standard format of the model would follow, as in (1),
section 1 of the paper.
This last relation (A1-04) will be functional in Appendix 6, when the free cash flow issue is going to be dealt with.Universidad del Cema          Working Papers Series          Incremental Cash Flows, Information Sets and  Conflicts of Interest            Rodolfo Apreda
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APPENDIX 2 Working Capital Adjustments
The following equation exhibits the main current assets components:
 (A2-01)
DCF t (current assets)    =   D t (cash)  +  D t (short-term investments)  +
+  D t (inventories)  +  D t (accounts receivable)  +  D t (other items)
We break down the expected cash balance change into two components:
•  cash required for normal operations, D   t  (cash for operations), which should be included in working capital
provisions for the daily running of a business;
•  cash non-required for normal operations in the period, D  t (cash not-for-operations), which actually perform as a
stock of excess liquidity.
Furthermore, D  t (short-term investments) do not need to become out-flows in the period. On the contrary, this is the
place where many companies should set up and manage financial assets portfolios. Main short-term investments
include stocks and bonds not issued by the firm, government bonds, term-deposits at banks, derivatives assets,
investment in mutual funds and promissory notes.
As from now, we will call “cash assets” to both D  t (cash not-for-operations) and D  t (short-term investments)
D t (cash assets)  =  D t (cash not-for-operations)  +  D t (short-term investments)
It seems worthy of being remarked here that Damodaran (1996) and Benninga (1997) were among the first to point out
the need of taking cash assets away from working capital provisions.
On the other hand, non-cash assets follow from (A1-01) and consist of changes in inventories, accounts receivable and
other current assets.  In this way, current assets may be translated as
D t (current assets)  =   D t (cash assets)  +  D t (cash for operations)   +  D t (non-cash assets)
and this singles out the actual amount of current assets that should be provisioned:
DCF t (net current assets)  =  D t (cash for operations)   +  D t (non-cash assets)
Hence, net working capital will be understood as net current assets minus current liabilities.
(A2-02)
DCF t (net working capital)   =   DCF t (net current assets)  –   DCF t (current liabilities)
Unless we asume cash assets amount to zero, changes in working capital should be assessed by means of relation
(A2-02). Otherwise, we would be mixing up actual cash flows with items that do not convey outflows by themselves.
APPENDIX 3 Fixed Assets Adjustments
In order to shape the fixed capital provisions in a realistic way, we start with the usually used format in the standard
cash flow format (Ross, 1999):
(A3-01)
DCF t (fixed assets)   =  gross fixed assets ( t )  –  gross fixed assets (t  – 1)
which is, along the holding period, equivalent to:Universidad del Cema          Working Papers Series          Incremental Cash Flows, Information Sets and  Conflicts of Interest            Rodolfo Apreda
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DCF t (fixed assets)   =   fixed assets purchases [ t – 1 ; t ]  –   fixed assets sales  [ t – 1 ; t ]
On the other hand, from the incremental balance sheet we have:
DCF t (net fixed assets)   =   net fixed assets ( t )  –  net fixed assets ( t – 1 )
Splitting down net fixed assets into its main components, we get
DCF t (net fixed assets)   =  [ gross fixed assets ( t ) – accumulated depreciation t  ] –
   –  [ gross fixed assets (t – 1) – accumulated depreciation t - 1  ]
and by means of (A3-01) we are led to
DCF t (net fixed assets)   =   DCF t (fixed assets)  – depreciation t
reaching thus the usual way of assessing the cash flow from capital expenses:
DCF t (fixed assets)   =    DCF t (net fixed assets)   +  depreciation t
Whenever improvements or maintenance expenses are fractionally or fully activated to enhance the value of assets in
place, we could write
DCF t (fixed assets)   =   fixed assets purchases [ t – 1 ; t ]   +
+   improvements and maintenance [ t – 1 ; t ]  –  fixed assets sales [ t – 1 ; t ]
APPENDIX  4 Variance Analysis in the Incremental Cash Flow Model
It is a tenet of the standard incremental cash flow model, as it was seen in section 1 under the guise of relationship (1)
in this paper, that
D CF t (assets)  =  D CF t (creditors)  +  D CF t (stockholders)
from which it follows that cash flows expected in the horizon [ t ; t + 1 ] and assessed at date “ t “ are stochastic
variables contingent on the information set  W ( t ; e ) where “ e “ denotes the economic agent who acts as a decision-
maker. The variance of the cash flows from assets turns out to be:
s  2 [ D CF t (assets) ]  =  E[ D CF t (assets)  -   E[ D CF t (assets) ] ] 2   =
= E[ D CFt (creditors)  +  D CFt (stockholders) ] -  E[ D CFt (creditors)  +  D CFt (stockholders)] ] 2 =
= E[  { D CFt (creditors) -  E[D CFt (creditors) } 2  + { D CFt (stockholders)] -  E[ D CFt (stockholders) } 2   +
+  2 . ( D CFt (creditors) -  E[D CFt (debt holders) ]  ) .  ( D CFt (stockholders)] -  E[ D CFt (stockholders)]  ) ]  
Finally,
s  2 [ D CF t (assets) ]   =   s  2 [ D CF t (creditors) ]  +    s  2 [ D CF t (stockholders ]  +
+   2 . cov [ D CF t (creditors) , D CF t (stockholders) ]
By the same token as above, we can also establish the risk measure of cash flows from assets by means of (4):Universidad del Cema          Working Papers Series          Incremental Cash Flows, Information Sets and  Conflicts of Interest            Rodolfo Apreda
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D CF t (assets)  =  D  CF t (operations)  –  D  CF t (working capital)  –  D CF t (fixed assets)
getting at the last:
s  2 [ D CF t (assets) ]    =   s  2 [ D CF t (operations) ]    +  s  2 [ D CF t (working capital) ]   +
+  s  2 [ D CF t (fixed assets) ]    +  2 . cov [ D CF t (operations) , D CF t (working capital) ]
+   2 . cov [ D CF t (operations) , D CF t (fixed capital) ]   +  2 . cov [ D CF t (working capital) , D CF t (fixed capital) ]
APPENDIX  5 Operations on sets
Given a space or universe X, non empty, a subset E of X will be defined as a set such that:
( " x ) :    x  ˛  E     ￿    x ˛  X
The set built up with all the subsets of X will be denoted as  P(X) and it comes defined as:
P(X)   =  {  A :  A  ˝  X  }
When dealing with sets of sets, it is rather preferred to speak about families of sets. Then, P(X)   is a family of sets. Let
us take two arbitrary subsets A and B in X. The following operations between them build up new sets.
Union of two sets:
A  ¨ ¨ B   =  {  x  :  x ˛ A  or  x ˛ B  }
Intersection of two sets:
A  ˙ ˙  B  =  {  x : x ˛ A  and  x ˛ B }
Complement of a set:
A C   =  {  x  :  x ˇ A }
Difference of two sets:
A – B   =  {  x  : x ˛ A  and  x ˇ B }
Hence, by the definition of complement we can write, as it was done in the paper,
A – B   =  A  ˙ ˙  B C
Symmetric difference of two sets:
A  D D B   =  {  x  : x ˛ A – B   or  x ˛ B – A }
APPENDIX  6 About the Free Cash Flows Issue
In a classical paper Jensen (1986) defined free cash flows in a format that has lately undergone some changes so as
to make them functional, but adding some confusion not only to its original meaning but also to the extent that they
could unequivocally claim being free outright.
Starting with Jensen’s definition, free cash flows mean
“cash flow in excess of that required to fund all projects that have positive net present values when
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Later, he adds: “Conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers over payout  policies are especially severe
when the organization generates substantial free cash flow. The problem is how to motivate managers to disgorge the
cash rather than investing it at below the cost of capital or wasting it on organization inefficiencies”
Current textbooks on Corporate Finance and in Valuation tried to embed this concept within the framework of the
incremental cash flow model. Let us follow up some examples.
a)  For instance, Benninga-Sarig (1997) and Damodaran (1996) define free cash flows this way:
Free Cash Flows t =
 =   Ebit t   –  taxes t    +  depreciation t  –  D CF t (working capital)  –  D CF t (fixed assets)
that is to say, free cash flows are identified with cash flows from assets. Hence:
Free Cash Flows t     =    DCF t (assets)
b) In a recent textbook on Corporate Finance, written by Damodaran, (Corporate Finance Theory and Practice,
Wiley, 1997), we find these remarks about Jensen’s notion of free cash flows:
“Free cash flows represent cash flows made on operations over which managers have discretionary spending
power; they may use them to take projects, pay them out to stockholders, or hold them as idle cash balances.”
to conclude in a caption that Free Cash Flows (Jensen’s) are the operating cash flows after taxes but before
discretionary capital expenditures, which does not match the assimilation of free cash flows with cash flows from
assets.
c)  Copeland-Koller-Murray, in a well known book on Valuation that is widely used by practitioners and MBA
students (Valuation, Wiley, 1995) deal with free cash flows this way:
Operating Free Cash Flow t  – Cash Flow from Non Operating Investments t  =  Cash Flows available to Investors t
This format amounts to saying that
DCF t (assets)  =  DCF t (to be directed to investors)
and it would be a synonym of the standard incremental cash flow model SICFM.
d)  It seems more unequivocal how Ross et al.  (Fundamentals of Corporate Finance, Irwin, 1995) cope with this
issue. Firstly, they remind what are free cash flows in the sense Jensen gave to such phrase:
“Suppose a firm has some excess cash after selecting all positive Net Present Value projects (this type of excess cash
is frequently referred to as free cash flows)” (page 512)
Secondly, they define cash flows from assets as “the total of cash flows to creditors and cash flows to
stockholders, consisting of the following: operating cash flow, capital spending and addition to net working
capital”.
Therefore, one thing are Jensen’s free cash flows and quite another cash flows from assets. The difference coming up
from distinctive sources by and large.Universidad del Cema          Working Papers Series          Incremental Cash Flows, Information Sets and  Conflicts of Interest            Rodolfo Apreda
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